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AN UPDATE TO STRIKING A BALANCE:
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VERSUS
CHILDREN'S PRIVACY INTERESTS IN
JUVENILE DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
WILLIAM WESLEY PATTON* AND KELLY CRECCO**
In Striking a Balance: Freedom of the Press Versus Children's
Privacy Interests in Juvenile Dependency Proceedings,' Kelly Crecco
favorably described a Los Angeles County, California, experiment
initiated by Judge Michael Nash which presumptively opened the child
abuse dependency courts to the media. A series of events subsequent to
her law review article have convinced us that the initial positive
assessment of Judge Nash's court order was incorrect for several reasons.
I. THE DANGERS OF JUDGES' JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS THAT
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH STATE LEGISLATORS' REJECTION OF
IDENTICAL STATE POLICIES
Crecco originally lauded Los Angeles Superior Supervising
Court Judge Michael Nash for his "[m]omentous change for Los Angeles
County" regarding his court order that "[m]embers of the press shall be
allowed access to juvenile dependency court hearings unless there is a
reasonable likelihood that such access will be harmful to the child's or
children's best interests."2 The media, direct beneficiaries of the open
* Professor and J. Alan Cook and Mary Schalling Cook Children's Law
Scholar, Whittier Law School; Lecturer, UCLA David Geffen School of Medicine,
Department of Psychiatry.
** Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2014;
Executive Editor, First Amendment Law Review.
1. Kelly Crecco, Striking A Balance: Freedom of the Press Versus Children's
Privacy Interests in Juvenile Dependency Hearings, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 490,
540 ("Each state should adopt an approach that allows for juvenile dependency
courtrooms to be presumptively open to the press and public.").
2. Id. at 517-18.
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court order, repeatedly praised Judge Nash for doing what the California
Legislature refused to do-presumptively open the courts to the press.3
A. Judge Nash's Involvement in the Failed Legislative Efforts to
Mandate Presumptively Open Dependency Courts in California
Although Crecco discussed two failed California bills that
attempted to create presumptively open dependency courts, the history of
a third failed open court bill sheds light on Judge Nash's involvement in
these legislative debates and raises serious questions regarding his
4
judgment to presumptively open the Los Angeles dependency courts.
In 2011, proposed California Assembly Bill 73 would have
created a "4-year pilot project in 3 counties to create a presumption that
juvenile court hearings in juvenile dependency cases be open to the
public . . . . " Most importantly, the legislature built into that bill several
protections for abused children and their families from unwarranted
invasions of their privacy and from the dissemination of confidential
information disclosed in those open child dependency proceedings. For
instance, the bill would have required that the child's attorney inform the
abused or neglected child of her "right to request that the hearing be
closed." 6 In addition, it would have required courts to "take appropriate
3. See Editorial, Thanks and No Thanks, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at A26;
Editorial, A Dependency Court Cure, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011),
http://articles.1atimes.com/20 11/feb/12/opinion/la-ed-dependency-20110212; Jim
Newton, Op-Ed., The Cost ofDelay, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2012, at A13; Editorial, An
Open-And-Shut Case, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2010), http://articies.latimes
.com/2010/dec/19/opinion/la-ed-dcfs-20101219; Jim Newton, Op-Ed., Secrecy That
Hurts Kids, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at Al 1; Editorial, Let Sun Shine on
Dependency Court, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/
201 1/apr/26/opinion/la-ed-court-20110426; Garrett Therolf, Presiding Judge
Prepares to Open L.A. County Dependency Courts, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2011, 1:20
PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/1 1/presiding-judge-prepares-to-
open-dependency-courts-.html; Garrett Therolf & John Hoeffel, Media Gain Access
to L. A. County Children's Courts, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2012), http://articles
.Iatimes.com/2012/feb/07/local/la-me-open-child-court-20120207.
4. Crecco, supra note 1, at 514-17.
5. See A.B. 73, 2011 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (amended in the Assembly on Apr. 14,
2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1 1-12/bill/asm/ab_0051-
0100/ab_73 bill 20110414_amended asm v97.pdf.
6. A.B. 73 § 2(c).
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action to keep personally identifiable information about the child or
about the child's sibling or parent confidential and . .. prevent release of
that information in any court hearing open to the public . .. . Finally,
the bill would have required an independent evaluation of the pilot
project, including measuring "the effects of opening the proceedings on
children."'
AB 73 failed for many reasons, including opposition by some
children's rights groups, mental health professionals, and the largest
organization of abused children in the country, the California Youth
Connection,9 even though one of the most powerful and influential
supporters of AB 73 was the Judicial Council of California.o This
council had also strongly supported the two previous attempts to
presumptively open the courts, Senate Bill 1391 (2000) and Assembly
Bill 2627 (2004).
Judge Nash, who issued the Blanket Order, was not only a
member of the Judicial Council from 2003-2006, he also co-chaired its
7. A.B. 73 § 2(e)(1).
8. A.B. 73 § 2(j).
9. The following organizations were some of those who opposed AB 73:
California Association of Marriage and Family Therapists; California Public
Defenders Association; Children's Law Center of Los Angeles; and the California
Youth Connection. Bill Analysis, Assembly Committee on Human Services, Apr. 26,
2011, at 25-26, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/l 1-12/bill/asm/ab 0051-
0100/ab 73 cfa 20110425_093017_asm comm.html [hereinafter Bill Analysis of
AB 73].
10. California Constitution Article VI, Section 6(d) provides for the creation of
a Judicial Council in order "[t]o improve the administration of justice the council
shall survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts, make
recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court
administration, practice and procedure, and perform other functions prescribed by
statute. The rules adopted shall not be inconsistent with statute." CAL. CONST. art.
VI, § 6(d).
11. Bill Analysis of AB 73, supra note 9, at 25. For a list of those supporting
SB 1391 (2000), including the Judicial Council of California, see Bill Analysis,
Assembly Committee on Judiciary, June 20, 2000, at 10, available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/sen/sb 1351-
1400/sb_1391 cfa_20000619 115719 asm comm.html. For a list of those
supporting Assembly Bill 2627, including the Judicial Council, see Bill Analysis,
Senate Judiciary Committee, June 22, 2004, at 16, available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab 2601-
2650/ab 2627 cfa 20040623_122457 sen comm.html.
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Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee from 1999-2003 and
served as a member of that committee from 2006-2012.12 During that
time frame, his committee advised the Judicial Council to support
legislation to presumptively open the courts, and he testified in the
California Legislature in favor of AB 73.13 One must wonder, therefore,
why Judge Nash disregarded the child protection measures included in
AB 73 that the Judicial Council supported when he promulgated his
Blanket Order presumptively opening the dependency courts. The
Blanket Order does not provide any of the following protections
guaranteed under AB 73: (1) requiring that abused children be informed
of their right to seek a closed hearing; (2) prohibiting publication of
identifying and/or confidential information; and (3) studying and
reporting on the effects on abused/neglected children of presumptively
opening the hearings to the media and public.'4 Although his Blanket
Order includes a detailed three and one-half page justification for
opening the courts, Judge Nash did not address why he rejected the
suggestions in AB 73 of including protections for abused children as part
12. The Judicial Council of California, Mission, at 13, available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/wall-of fame_0209.pdf.; Family & Juvenile
Law Advisory Committee Membership List, 1999-2013 (obtained via Judicial
Administrative Records Request) (on file with author William Wesley Patton).
13. "The Judicial Council of California's Family and Juvenile Law Advisory
Committee makes recommendations to the council for improving the administration
of justice in all cases involving marriage, family, or children." Fact Sheet,
Administrative Office of the Courts, Jan. 2014, available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fjla.pdf. From 1999 to 2003, Judge Nash co-
chaired the Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee. Family & Juvenile Law
Advisory Committee (provided to Professor William Wesley Patton on November
13, 2013, by the California Judicial Council Administrative Office of the Courts in
response to Judicial Administrative Records Request #001088) (on file with author
William Wesley Patton). Judge Michael Nash Elected to Board ofNational Juvenile,
Family Court Judges Group, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, Aug. 6, 2003, at 3,
available at http://www.metnews.com/articles/nash080603.htm. "Among the most
fervent advocates for transparency is Michael Nash, the presiding judge of Los
Angeles County Juvenile Court. He backed the efforts of Schiff [SB 1391] and
Steinberg [AB 2627] and has urged the Legislature to finally adopt legislation [AB
73] to open dependency proceedings." Editorial, An Open-And-Shut Case, supra
note 3. "Judge Michael Nash, the presiding judge of the juvenile courts for Los
Angeles County, was among the last to testify at Feurer's hearing [on AB 73]."
Newton, supra note 3, at Al1.
14. A.B. 73, 2011-12 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
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of the balancing of interests between children's privacy and safety and
the concerns for openness and system accountability. 5
Equally important, Judge Nash was on the Judicial Council
Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee for most of the years in
which the legislative debate over presumptively open courts raged. As
such, he should have been aware that one of the reasons that the three
open court bills did not pass was the fear that opening the courts could
cost California more than $1 billion in federal child abuse funding due to
potential violations of federal confidentiality requirements. For instance,
in 2000, Judge Nash was co-chair of the Judicial Council committee that
recommended passage of SB 1391, even though the California
Legislative Analysis of that bill stated that passage could cause:
Potential major loss of federal funds, up to $1.49
billion, from Titles IV-B and IV-E of the Social
Security Act, and the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (CAPTA), to the extent the state is
out of compliance with federal confidentiality
requirements. In FY 2000-01, California will
receive federal funds totaling $1.49 billion from
these programs ($1.4 billion, Title IV-E; $84
million, Title IV-B; and $7 million, CAPTA).
And in 2004, the Legislative Analysis of AB 2627 proclaimed
that:
This bill contains a provision identical to a
provision in SB 1391 of 2000. It provides that the
bill would be inoperative on the date the
Department of Social Services director makes a
finding that the state is out of compliance with
federal confidentiality requirements governing the
15. Blanket Order Re: WIC 346 and Public and Media Attendance at
Dependency Court Hearing, Super. Ct. of Cal. Cnty. of L.A. (Jan. 31, 2012),
available at http://www.nccpr.org/reports/nashdraftorder.pdf.
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administration of the federal programs conducted
pursuant to the Social Security Act that will result
in the loss of federal funds.17
And finally, in 2011, when Judge Nash was again a member of
the Judicial Council Committee recommending passage of AB 73, the
Legislative Analysis noted:
Federal law later clarified pursuant to the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA)
reauthorization of 2003 that confidentiality
requirements tied to state funding do not prohibit
states from granting public access to court
proceedings, provided the public access does not
jeopardize the safety and well-being of the child,
parents, and families.
In considering the three presumptively open child dependency
court bills, the California Legislature was clearly very concerned that
breaches of federally protected confidential information could result in a
serious loss of federal child abuse prevention revenue if the statute did
not sufficiently protect abused children and their families. However,
Judge Nash in his Blanket Order apparently ignored this financial risk
since he provided inadequate protections for children and virtually no
protection for other family members as required by federal regulations.
He thus placed California at risk of losing more than $1 billion in child
abuse prevention funding.
In order to ameliorate the possibility of losing that funding, on
July 17, 2012, Professor Patton wrote a letter to George H. Sheldon,
Acting Assistant Secretary for the Administration of Children and
Families under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
asking for an investigation of Judge Nash's Blanket Order as a possible
violation of the confidentiality requirements of the Child Abuse
17. Bill Analysis, Senate Judiciary Committee, June 22, 2004, at 16, available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_2601-2650/ab_2627_cfa
20040623 122457 sen comm.html.
18. Bill Analysis of AB 73, supra note 9, at 16 (emphasis added).
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Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA)19 and the Social Security Act.20
After reviewing the evidence regarding the Blanket Order's possible
federal confidentiality violations, on August 13, 2012, Acting Secretary
Sheldon referred the case to the "Administration for Children and
Families Regional Office (RO) staff in San Francisco to contact the
California Department of Social Services" to determine whether
California is in compliance with CAPTA.2 1 On October 31, 2012,
Douglas Southard, Regional Program Manager, Region IX, Children's
Bureau Administration of Children and Families, stated that his office
had "made contact with the California Department of Social Services
(CDSS). At our request, they are in the process of fact finding." 22
On December 15, 2012, Professor Patton filed a Freedom of
Information Act Request for correspondence between the Children's
23Bureau and the California Department of Social Services, and was
provided a document dated January 31, 2013, from the State of
California Health and Human Services Agency's Department of Social
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(c) provides a very limited exception to the
confidentiality requirements in CAPTA "relating to public access to court
proceedings . . . [if such policies] at a minimum, ensure the safety and well-being of
the child, parents and family." 42 U.S.C.A. § 67 1(c) (West 2010).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106(a)(G) of the Social Security Act contains similar
language to that in CAPTA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106(a)(G) (West 2010). Letter from
William Wesley Patton, Professor and J. Alan Cook and Mary Schalling Cook
Children's Law Scholar, Whittier Law School, to George H. Sheldon, Acting
Assistant Secretary for the Administration of Children and Families, U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services (July 17, 2012) (on file with author
William Wesley Patton).
21. Letter from George H. Sheldon, Acting Assistant Secretary for the
Administration of Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services, to William Wesley Patton, Professor and J. Alan Cook and Mary Schalling
Cook Children's Law Scholar, Whittier Law School (Aug. 13, 2012) (on file with
author William Wesley Patton).
22. Letter from Douglas Southard, Regional Program Manager, Region IX,
Children's Bureau Administration of Children and Families, to William Wesley
Patton, Professor and J. Alan Cook and Mary Schalling Cook Children's Law
Scholar, Whittier Law School (Oct. 31, 2012) (on file with author William Wesley
Patton).
23. On January 2, 2013, Professor Patton received an email confirmation from
the Department of Children and Family Services acknowledging his FOIA request
and issuing a Request Number of 13-0056 (on file with author William Wesley
Patton).
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Services to Douglas Southard.24 In that letter, the California Department
of Social Services reported that it had:
engaged this issue [of federal confidentiality] with
Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles Dependency
Courts, and has discussed possible revisions of the
Blanket Order to ensure conformity with the Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA),
and Title IV-E. As a result of that dialogue, the
Presiding Judge is in the process of revising the
Blanket Order to address federal conformity
25
concerns.
The revised Blanket Order still did not include any of the child
safety protections recommended in AB 73, but it appended the statutory
language from CAPTA and the Social Security Act regarding the
necessity of ensuring "the safety and well-being of the child, parents, and
families." The federal investigation of the Blanket Order is still pending,
but Professor Patton's response filed with the Regional Office of the
Administration of Children and Families Children's Bureau argues that
the revised Blanket Order still violates CAPTA and the Social Security
Act because it: (1) does not provide the abused child with an opportunity
to inform the court why press attendance will be harmful without the
presence of the media; (2) fails to provide parents and other family
members with rights to privacy protection that are not interdependent on
children's safety; (3) does not require the juvenile court judge to make an
independent decision regarding the best interests of the child unless a
party objects to press and/or public attendance; and (4) violates CAPTA
because the State of California has not promulgated a presumptively
open child dependency system and has not secured the required
permission of the Secretary for the Administration for Children and
Families for a limited waiver of federally guaranteed confidentiality
24. Letter from the State of California Health and Human Services Agency,
Department of Social Services, to Douglas Southard, Regional Program Manager,
Region IX, Children's Bureau Administration of Children and Families (Jan. 31,
2012) (on file with author William Wesley Patton).
25. Id. at 1.
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26protections. We will have to await the further federal investigation to
determine the legal status of the revised Blanket Order.
B. The Review ofJudge Nash's Blanket Order in the California Court of
Appeal
Crecco states that the "California Court of Appeal denied the
Children's Law Center's petition to overturn Judge Nash's order." 27 Her
description, however, might mistakenly lead the reader to conclude that
the Court of Appeal actually considered the substantive arguments in the
writ. The basis for the Court of Appeal's denial of the writ was not
available to Crecco since the court files are confidential. In fact, the
Court of Appeal merely denied the writ because it concluded
procedurally that the Children's Law Center lacked standing to litigate
the legality of the Blanket Order.28 The substance of the opposition to the
Blanket Order was never considered by the Court of Appeal.
However, a Court of Appeal case decided recently, after the
publication of Crecco's article, determined that Judge Nash's Blanket
Order is illegal under California law. In Los Angeles County Department
29
of Children and Family Services v. A.L., an abused child appealed a
juvenile court judge's determination based upon the Blanket Order that
30
the Los Angeles Times could attend her full dependency court hearing.
26. Letter from William Wesley Patton, Professor and J. Alan Cook and Mary
Schalling Cook Children's Law Scholar, Whittier Law School, to Douglas Southard,
Regional Program Manager, Region IX, Children's Bureau Administration of
Children and Families (Feb. 8, 2013) (on file with author William Wesley Patton).
27. Crecco, supra note 1, at 518.
28. On February 15, 2012, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Two, Case Number B238899, denied the writ by the Children's
Law Center of California for a petition for writ of mandate "for lack of standing."
(on file with author William Wesley Patton). The court of appeal also summarily
denied the Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers' writ regarding Judge Nash's Blanket
Order based upon a lack of standing. See Court of Appeal of the State Of California,
Second Appellate District, Division Two, Case Number B238903, petition for writ
of mandate "denied for lack of standing." (on file with author William Wesley
Patton). The court of appeal in Case Number B238899 also refused to file an amicus
curiae brief supporting a writ against Judge Nash regarding the Blanket Order filed
by Whittier Law School. (on file with author William Wesley Patton).
29. In re A.L., 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589 (Cal Ct. App. 2014).
30. Id. at 361.
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Prior to this decision, the child had objected to the presence of the Times
and other media outlets at her hearings and had asked the juvenile court
for an opportunity to explain to the court why the press should be
excluded from her hearings.31 The juvenile court judge ruled against the
child and granted the press access to her hearings, including a
preliminary hearing on her motion to exclude the press.32
The appellate court ruled that the Blanket Order created "a
paradigm shift from the plain meaning of Section 346," 3 the statute that
controls access to dependency court hearings. The court found that the
Blanket Order did not require the juvenile court judge in each
dependency case to balance the interests of the press with those of the
child's best interest; illegally shifted the burden of proving potential
harm from the press coverage from the media to the abused child who is
also required to object to the media's presence; and transmogrified the
Legislature's determination that hearings are presumptively closed to a
rule of presumptively open proceedings. 34 Because Judge Nash's Blanket
Order conflicts with the California statute, the appellate court found that
it exceeded his "inherent rulemaking" authority and was thus illegal.35
C. Trial Court Judges'Administrative Orders and Separation ofPowers
Concerns
"Judicial Activism" is one of the most trite, yet politically
36charged terms. The term may serve expedient political purposes, yet at
31. Id. at 359-60.
32. Id. at 360-61.
33. Id. at 364.
34. Id.,at 364-66.
35. Id. at 363-64.
36.
During the 1990s, the terms "judicial activism" and
"judicial activist" appeared in an astounding 3,815 journal
and law review articles. In the first four years of the
twenty-first century, these terms have surfaced in another
1,817 articles-an average of more than 450 per year.
Judges today are far more likely to accuse their colleagues
of judicial activism than they were in prior decades. And
the term has assumed a prominent role in public debates,
584
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its structural heart rests a legitimate concern regarding separation of
powers.3 7 The Blanket Order illustrates the most inimical aspects of the
cusp between legitimate exercise of judicial administrative discretion and
the usurpation of the people's right to a legislative determination
regarding questions of public policy that do not involve absolute
constitutional rights. 38 During the legislative debates of the three
California presumptively open dependency court bills, hundreds of
different legislators heard evidence from dozens of organizations in
numerous hearings. These hearings addressed the balancing of interests
between the public's and media's need for access to the court hearings
and the correlative need to protect child abuse victims and their families
from unwarranted invasions of their privacy with the state and federal
statutory guarantees of confidentiality.3 9 As was demonstrated,40 the
appearing regularly in editorial pages, Web "blogs,"
political discussion, and confirmation battles.
Keenan D. Kimiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism," 92
CAL. L. REv. 1441, 1442-43 (2004); see generally, Thomas L. Murphy, The
Dangers of Overreacting to Judicial Activism, 19 UTAH BAR J. 38 (Feb. 2006)
(arguing that it is difficult to define judicial activism and that doing so has inherent
dangers).
37. As stated in Elkins v. Super. Ct. of Contra Costa Cnty., "[a] trial court is
without authority to adopt local rules or procedures that conflict with statutes or with
rules of court adopted by the Judicial Council, or that are inconsistent with the
Constitution or case law." 163 P.3d 160, 166 (Cal. 2007). See also Rutherford v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1213-14 (Cal. 1997); Hall v. Super. Ct. of Los
Angeles Cnty., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d, 211-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). As provided in
Government Code section 68070, subdivision (a): "Every court may make rules for
its own government and the government of its officers not inconsistent with law or
with the rules adopted and prescribed by the Judicial Council." CAL. Gov'T CODE §
68070(a) (West 2013) (emphasis added); Courts, § 203, in 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure
(5th ed. 2008) 285-86; Courts, § 204, in 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2006 supp.) 87-
88.
38. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the California courts have
determined that the press and public have a constitutional right of access to child
dependency court proceedings. See San Bernardino Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Social
Servs. v. Super. Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). This discussion
does not, therefore, address the legality of courts' legitimate authority to hold
statutes unconstitutional under separation of powers.
39. For instance, SB 1391 had six senate hearings and was amended five times
before its eventual defeat. See Documents Associated with SB 1391 in the Session
(2000), http://www.legislature.ca.gov/cgi-bin/port-postquery?bill number-sb_1391
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three California open court bills involved political compromises among
those supporting openness and those supporting child and family
protection with an eventual outcome of bills proposing more openness,
but only if sufficient protections were guaranteed.
However, even though Judge Nash considered opposing views
regarding the promulgation of his Blanket Order, his decision was not
tempered by the same deliberative group decision-making necessary for
forging effective consensus through legislative debate. Therefore, his
Blanket Order, unlike the three legislative bills, focused on providing the
press access to the courts, but failed to sufficiently balance that public
policy with the necessity of protecting abused children and their families.
Equally problematic is that he, as a single judicial officer in a single
county in California, risked the loss of more than $1 billion in federal
funding for child abuse prevention and treatment, a risk rejected by the
legislature three times. He issued an order he considered important for
Los Angeles County, but created a risk to taxpayers throughout the state
of California. Judge Nash's failure to include the specific child and
family protections recommended in AB 73 and his disregard for the
possibility of losing a significant amount of federal child abuse funding
present serious concerns.
II. THE CONNECTICUT LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE TO ITS FAILED
PRESUMPTIVELY OPEN PILOT PROJECT WAS TO REJECT A PRESUMPTIVE
RIGHT OF MEDIA ATTENDANCE IN CHILD ABUSE HEARINGS
In her earlier article, Crecco correctly noted that in Connecticut
some cases involving juveniles are open to the press and public.4 1
Section 46b-122(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes, which controls
non-dependency hearings, states that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection
&sess=9900&house=B&author-schiff. AB 2627 had five legislative hearings and
was amended three times. See Documents Associated with AB 2627 in the Session
(2004), http://www.legislature.ca.gov/cgi-bin/port-postquery. And AB 73 had two
legislative hearings and was amended twice. See Documents Associated with AB 73
in the 2011-2012 Session (2011), http://www.legislature.ca.gov/cgi-bin/port-
postquery?bill_number-ab 73&sess=PREV&house=B&author-feuer.
40. See supra Part I.A.
41. Crecco, supra note 1, at 511.
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(c)" a juvenile court judge cannot exclude any person without a hearing
and a finding of "good cause shown."4 2
However, after Connecticut's failed presumptively open court
pilot project, the legislature specifically changed child dependency
proceedings to presumptively closed, but provided discretion to juvenile
court judges on a case-by-case basis to admit the public and/or press.
Section 46b-122(c), which only applies in child dependency proceedings,
provides that a juvenile court judge in:
[A] juvenile matter, in which a child is alleged to
be uncared for, neglected, abused or dependent or
in which a child is the subject of a petition for
termination of parental rights, may permit any
person whom the court finds has a legitimate
interest in the hearing or the work of the court to
attend such hearing.43
The difference between presumptively open and discretionarily
open juvenile dependency courts is not merely a matter of semantics. The
public policy battle over which of those two models should be adopted
has been fought for more than fifteen years in several states.44 For
instance, in Connecticut, proposed legislation introduced by
presumptively open court advocates was defeated in 200445 and in
2005.46 And in 2009, a third bill to presumptively open the Connecticut
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-122(b) (2012).
43. Id. at § 46b-122(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
44. For a discussion of many of those legislative debates, see William Wesley
Patton, Revictimizing Child Abuse Victims: An Empirical Rebuttal To The Open
Juvenile Dependency Court Reform Movement, 38 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 303
(2005); William Wesley Patton, When The Empirical Base Crumbles: The Myth
That Open Dependency Proceedings Do Not Psychologically Damage Abused
Children, 33 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 29 (2009); William Wesley Patton, Pandora's
Box: Opening Child Protection Cases to the Press and Public, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV.
181 (2000).
45. For a discussion of the defeat of Connecticut Raised Bill 5555, see William
Wesley Patton, The Connecticut Open-Court Movement: Reflection and
Remonstration, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 8 (2004-2005).
46. For a discussion of failed House Bill 6812 in 2005, see William Wesley
Patton, Connecticut's Failed Open Juvenile Dependency Court Pilot Project:
587
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courts was amended to provide for a limited pilot project to test the
effectiveness and safety of presumptively open courts. 4 7 Crecco correctly
notes that Connecticut ended its pilot program after the Advisory Board
rejected the presumptively open dependency court model.48 After finding
little benefit and potential danger to abused children, the Advisory Panel
recommended a discretionarily open system requiring juvenile court
judges on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to admit persons
into proceedings and whom specifically to admit into those
.49proceedings.
In 2011, the Connecticut Legislature accepted the Advisory
Board's recommendation by promulgating §46b-122(c), which modified
the presumptively open language of the pilot study with language
Presumptively Open Juvenile Court Doors Closed Again to Protect Abused
Children, 11 WHITTIER J. OF CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 85 (2011).
47. For a discussion of Connecticut House Bill 6419 [Public Act No. 09-194],
see id. at 87-88. HB 6419, section 5(b) stated that:
The Judicial Council shall establish, in a superior court for
juvenile matters location designated by the Chief Court
Administrator, a pilot program to increase public access to
proceedings in which a child is alleged to be uncared for,
neglected, abused or dependent or is the subject of a
petition for termination of parental rights. In any
proceeding under this subsection, the judge may order on a
case-by-case basis that such proceedings be kept separate
and apart and heard in accordance with subsection (a) of
this section, upon motion of any party for good cause
shown ....
Substitute H.B. No. 6419, Pub. Act No. 09-194 §§ 5(b) (2009), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/act/Pa/pdf/2009PA-00194-ROOHB-06419-PA.PDF. And
in HB 6419, section 6, the court established policies for the new presumptively open
dependency court proceedings, including the creation of a "Juvenile Access Pilot
Program Advisory Board" to review the pilot project. Id. at § 6.
48. Crecco, supra note 1, at 510-11.
49. Juvenile Access Pilot Program Advisory Board, Report to the Connecticut
General Assembly 15, 30 (2010), available at http://jud.ct.gov/Committees
/juvaccess/Final report 123010.pdf [hereinafter Connecticut Report]. The Report
indicated "significant concerns . . . that opening child protection proceedings could
potentially harm children." Id. at 15.
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creating a discretionarily open dependency court system rather than a
presumptively open court system.50
Children are at much more risk of juragenic psychological harm
in a presumptively open dependency court system than in a
discretionarily open court system for a number of reasons. Abused
children suffer short-term and long-term psychological risk by having
their cases open to the media and public. First, child abuse victims suffer
trauma from testifying before strangers. "In the last decade,
developmental victimology studies have determined that abused children
develop a sense of powerlessness, suffer social stigmatization, internalize
self-blame, and have a deep sense of betrayal."" Even if no confidential
information concerning the detailed facts of the child victim's abuse is
ever published, child victims still fear the possibility of such
publication.52 In addition, an especially vulnerable group of children,
LGBTQ child abuse victims, face disclosure of the most intimate facts
regarding their gender identity in proceedings in which the court must
find the most appropriate and safe out-of-home placements should these
children not be returned home.
50. The Connecticut Legislature in P.A. 11-51 "deleted former Subsec. (b) re
pilot program, added new Subsec. (c) re attendance of persons court finds has a
legitimate interest and prohibitions on further disclosure of information . . . ." See
legislative history section of Section 46b-122. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-122 (2012),
available at http://law.justia.com/codes/connecticut/2012/title-46b/chapter-
815t/section-46b-122/.
51. William Wesley Patton, Viewing Child Witnesses Through a Child and
Adolescent Psychiatric Lens: How Attorneys' Ethical Duties Exacerbate Children's
Psychopathology, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 369, 372-74 (2010).
52. Child victims have a legitimate fear that facts disclosed in court will be
published by some media source. For a study of journalistic ethics and a survey of
child victim information actually published in the media, see William Wesley
Patton, The Psychiatric Implications of Media Ethics Code Policies Regarding the
Publication of Child Abuse Victim Data: A Universal Deontological Model Code, 16
U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 427 (2012).
53. "A recent review of the research identified 19 studies linking suicidal
behavior in lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) adolescents to bullying at school . . . ."
Suicide and Bullying: Issue Brief SUICIDE PREVENTION RESOURCE CENTER 1, 3
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.suicidepreventionlifeline.org/App
_Files/Media/PDF/sprc.pdf. Although most literature focuses on the severe verbal
and/or physical attacks on LGBT children, in reality they suffer a constant
bombardment of lesser insults or attacks termed "microassaults and microinsults,
suggesting that that LGB persons may ... experience overt discrimination on a more
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Second, if the media has a statutory presumptive right to be
present, the burden of proving that they should be removed is often
shifted to the child and decreases the likelihood that confidentiality will
protect the child victim.54 Finally, if the media has a presumptive
statutory right to be in the courtroom, any attempts by the court to limit
the media's publication of information gleaned during the hearing are
substantially curtailed as a prior restraint violation of the First
Amendment. In contrast, in a discretionarily open system, since the
media does not have an absolute statutory or constitutional right to enter,
juvenile court judges can condition their entry upon an agreement that
regular basis." Kevin L. Nadal et al., Sexual Orientation Microaggressions: "Death
by a Thousand Cuts" for Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth, 8 J. LGBT YouTH 234,
252 (2011). "[B]etween 25 and 35 percent of sexual minority adolescents report at
least one suicide attempt . . . ." N. Eugene Walls, Pam Hancock & Hope Wisneski,
Differentiating the Social Service Needs of Homeless Sexual Minority Youths from
Those of Non-homeless Sexual Minority Youths, 13 J. CHILDREN & POVERTY 177,
182 (2007). New York City has a policy in providing the homeless with shelter
consistent with their gender identity. In 2006, the NYC policy provided that "staff
will address individuals with names, titles and other terms appropriate to their
gender identity . . . [and] staff at Intake/Shelter assignments will receive training on
diversity, transgender and intersex issues." Dianna Scholl, For Transgender
Homeless, Choice of Shelter Can Prevent Violence, CITY LIMITS (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://www.citylimits.org/news/articles/4235/for-transgender-
homeless#.UrO5kPaSLOQ. For an excellent discussion of the risk factors for
LGBTQ youth, see Susan M. Swearer Napolitano, Risk Factors for and Outcomes of
Bullying and Victimization (Educational Psychology Papers and Publications, Paper
No. 132, 2011), available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article= 1131&context=edpsychpapers. "Unless disclosure is legally
required, no one should disclose information about sexual orientation or gender
identity unless that person can identify a direct benefit to the youth." Shannan
Wilber, Carolyn Reyes & Jody Marsamer, The Model Standards Project: Creating
Inclusive Systems for LGBT Youth in Out-of-Home Care, LXXXV CHILD WELFARE
133, 140-41 (2006).
54. For instance, see Los Angeles Superior Court Blanket Order which
provides: "1. Members of the press are deemed to have a legitimate interest in the
work of the court. 2. Members of the press shall be allowed access to Juvenile
Dependency Court hearings unless there is a reasonable likelihood that such access
will be harmful to the child's or children's best interests." Blanket Order Re: WIC
346 and Public and Media Attendance at Dependency Court Hearing, Super. Ct. of
Cal. Cnty. of L.A. 4-5 (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.nccpr.org/reports/
nashdraftorder.pdf. Furthermore, "the party objecting must demonstrate that harm or
detriment to the minor child is reasonably likely to occur in the case as a result of
permitting the public or press access to the proceeding." Id.
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identifying information shall not be published regarding the parties. In
fact, Connecticut General Statute § 46b-122(c) perfectly illustrates this
point since it permits the juvenile court judge:
for the child's safety and protection and for good
cause shown, [to] prohibit any person or
representative of any agency . . . including a
representative of the news media ... from further
disclosing any information that would identify the
child, the custodian or caretaker of the child or the
members of the child's family involved in the
.55hearing.
III. THE MINNESOTA OPEN COURT STUDY CRECCO RELIES UPON TO
DEMONSTRATE SAFETY TO ABUSED CHILDREN IN PRESUMPTIVELY
OPEN HEARINGS HAS BEEN IMPEACHED BY ITS AUTHOR IN TESTIMONY
IN COURT UNDER OATH
Crecco relied upon a 2001 study by the National Center for State
Courts (NCSC) of the Minnesota open dependency court pilot project
that concluded that no harm to abused children was found in the
presumptively open court system. However, the author and
methodological designer of the NCSC study testified under oath that the
study was seriously methodologically flawed. For instance, he testified
affirmatively to the following question: "So you indicated that you
couldn't speak to children because Minnesota basically asked you not to
[?]"5 Ironically, Minnesota prohibited its own researchers from talking
to the abused children in a controlled, non-threatening environment, but
permitted the press and public access to watch these same abused
55. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-122(c) (2012).
56. Crecco, supra note 1, at 509.
57. See Patton, When the Empirical Base Crumbles, supra note 44, at 32
(quoting the sworn testimony from Transcript of Proceedings, In re San Mateo
County Human Services Agency (Super. Ct. San Mateo Cnty., Dept. 5, Mar. 3, 2005)
(on file with author William Wesley Patton) [hereinafter Trial Transcript]).
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children testify in court. The NCSC author further testified that his
research team did not discuss possible psychological harm to abused
children in the system with any mental health providers in that system,
and that the Minnesota governmental officials, not his research team,
selected the professionals that he was permitted to interview regarding
harm to children.5 Further, the study's author during his testimony was
unable to define the term "extraordinary harm" that was supposed to be
the type of harm that his research team was investigating, and finally he
admitted that the NCSC study was not methodologically sound: "I'm not
claiming that this is the most full-proof study," in part because he simply
did not have a budget sufficient to investigate relevant data regarding
possible harm to the abused children. Therefore, the Minnesota study
does not provide sufficient reliable evidence of safety to children in
61
presumptively open dependency proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates the serious social, psychological, and
economic problems created when superior court judges promulgate
administrative, system-wide changes in policies rejected by the state
legislature. Complex social issues such as the balance between children's
and families' privacy and the need for public and press access to judicial
proceedings to perfect effective accountability are issues that are not well
suited for judicial administrative decisions which are system-wide rather
than determinations on a case-by-case basis. Rather, these important
political issues are best left to the legislative process.
58. Although he testified that it would have been more methodologically sound
to ask the abused children about their experiences, he could not do so because
Minnesota officials would not permit it. Id. at 32 (citing Trial Transcript, at 16-17).
59. Id. at 32.
60. Id. at 33-34 (citing Trial Transcript, at 45-46, 74, 92, 95).
61. Crecco also provides a discussion of an Arizona Pilot Program study of
presumptively open courts. Crecco, supra note 1, at 509-11. However, the Arizona
Pilot Project study was based upon the methodologically unsound NCSC study and
suffered from the same problems of a lack of funding and an inability to interview
the people in the system who would have the best knowledge about whether abused
children were harmed by the process. See Patton, When The Empirical Base
Crumbles, supra note 44, at 35-36.
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